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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ILLINOIS
RULE 1.6(b) AND THE AIDS
CONFIDENTIALITY ACT
ScoT H. ISAACMAN*
INTRODUCTION

As the number of people infected with HIV 1 escalates, 2 so does
3
the frequency of HIV-positive individuals consulting attorneys.
These clients may wish legal assistance with estate planning and
durable powers of attorney for health care and property; 4 continuing medical and insurance benefits;5 divorce, custody, and visitation;6 employment problems; 7 and a host of other legal issues.
With HIV-positive clients, an ethical dilemma may arise. During the course of determining background information, the client
will disclose his or her serostatus s and intimate relationships with
* Dr. Isaacman is a Staff Physician with the Cook County Department of
Health and an Adjunct Professor at The John Marshall Law School and DePaul
University. He received his B.A. from Temple University, cum laude; his M.S.
from Temple University; his D.O. from the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic
Medicine; and his J.D. from The John Marshall Law School. The opinions expressed in this article belong to the author alone and do not reflect the views of
the department of health or any law school. Dr. Isaacman wishes to thank Dr.
Gail Brenner for posing a similar ethical enigma involving psychologists and
Professor Marck Wojcik for commenting on the initial draft.
1. HIV is the designation, by the International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses, of the human immunodeficiency virus, the causative agent of
AIDS. Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 232 ScIENCE 697 (1986). See also ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7303(c)(1991).
2. Centers for Disease Control, The Second 100,000 Cases of Acquired Immunodefzciency Syndrome - United States, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REP.

28 (1992).

3. A Report on AIDS-Related Lawsuits, 7 MEDICAL ETmICS 1 (1992).
4. See generally Emily Berendt & Laura L. Michaels, Your HIV Positive
Client"Easing the Burden on the Family Through Estate Planning,24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 509 (1990).
5. Mark Scherzer, Insuranceand Employee Benefits, ch. 8 in AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL: A LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL GUIDE (Paul Albert et al., eds., 3d
ed. 1991).
6. See generally Kristin Booth Glen, Parents with AIDS, Children with
AIDS: The Law Is Only Now Starting to Catch Up With This Family
Nightmare, 29 JUDGES' J. 14 (Spring 1990); Andrew Schepard, AIDS and Divorce, 23 FAM. L. Q. 1 (1989).
7. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, 119-120 (1988).

HUMAN

IMMU-

8. Serostatus is a colloquial phrase for the HIV blood test results. The test
is a serologic analysis giving positive, indeterminate, and negative results. Serostatus is generally referred to as seropositive or seronegative.
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others. 9 Quite possibly, the client may be unwilling to ir:orm sexual partners 10 and may even expressly request the attorney's help
in keeping the HIV results from others. Knowing that certain conduct"1 can transmit HIV, 12 knowing that transmission can result in
a fatal disease, 13 and knowing that such conduct can be a felony
offense, 14 what should the attorney do?
As of August 1, 1990, the Code of Professional Responsibility
was replaced by the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct.' 5 Under
9. The relationships referred to here concern specifically identified sexual
contacts, such as those between husbands, wives, or lovers.
10. Suzanne E. Landis et al., Results ofa Randomized Trial ofPartnerNotification in Cases of HIV Infection in North Carolina,326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101
(1992); Gary Marks et al., Self-disclosure of HIV Infection to Sexual Partners,
81 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1321 (1991); John M. Zenilman et al., Effect of HIV
Posttest Counseling on STD Incidence, 267 JAMA 843 (1992).

11. The U.S. Public Health Service stated: "HIV has three main modes of
transmission: sexual contact with an infected person, exposure to infected blood
or blood products (mainly through needle-sharing among IV-drug users), and
perinatal transmission from an infected woman to her fetus ... ." Centers for
Disease Control, AIDS and Human Immunodefwiency Virus Infection in the
United States: 1988 Update, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., at 2
(Supp. 1989).

12. Although other routes of HIV transmission occur, this article focuses on
heterosexual transmission because the Centers for Disease Control reported
that heterosexuals have the highest increase in rate of HIV transmission. Ruth
Berkelnan et al., Women and AIDS: The Increasing Role of Heterosexual
Transmission in the United States, Abstract W.C. 102, VII International Con-

ference on AIDS (Florence, Italy 1991). For heterosexual transmission in gen-

eral, see Isabelle De Vicenzi, Heterosexual Transmission of HIV 267 JAMA
1919 (1992); Vincent F. Guinee, Heterosexual Transmission of HIV, 267 JAMA
1918 (1992); Nancy S. Padian et al., Female-to-Male Transmission of Human
Immunodefwiency Virus, 266 JAMA 1664 (1991); James R. Allen & Valerie P.
Setlow, Heterosexual Transmissionof HIV A View of the Future, 266 JAMA
1695 (1991); Francesco Chiodo et al., Risk Factorsin Heterosexual Transmission

of HIV, Abstract Th.C. 583, VII International Conference on AIDS (Florence,
Italy 1991); Alberto Saracco, Incidence of Seroconversion in Women Who Are
Steady Partnersof HIV Infected Men, Abstract Th.C. 586, VII International

Conference on AIDS (Florence, Italy 1991); and Nancy S. Padian et al., The
Effect of Number of Exposures on the Risk of HeterosexualHIV Transmission,
161 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 883 (1990).

The same analysis applies to male homosexual contacts and to unsterile
needle-sharing. Both pose risks of BIV transmission. See INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE 1988, 45 (1988).

13. HIV transmission eventually causes AIDS in the recipient. NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIDS: THE SECOND DECADE, 39 (1990); Dennis Osmond,
Progression to AIDS in Persons Testing Seropositive for Antibody to HIV
§ 1.1.6, in THE AIDS KNOWLEDGE BASE (P.T. Cohen et al., eds., 1990).
For the progression of HIV infection to AIDS and death, see generally,
George F. Lempe et al., Survival Trendsfor Patientswith AIDS, 263 JAMA 402
(1990). In Illinois, of all the AIDS cases diagnosed in 1985, 88% of those individuals have died from the disease. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, AIDS/HIV
SURVEILLANCE REPORT, at 5 (1992).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1991). The constitutionality of this
statute is under consideration since it was declared unconstitutionally vague in
State v. Caretha Russell, No. 91cf1304 (St. Clair 1992).
15. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, art. VIII (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
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Illinois Rule 1.6(b), a lawyer is required to reveal confidential information to "prevent the client from committing an act that would
result in death or serious bodily harm."' 6 An HIV-infected client
who is engaging in sexual conduct' 7 with others is committing acts
which can transmit HIV,' 8 lead to the development of AIDS,' 9 and
cause death. 20 Even if an attorney is unfamiliar with the transmissibility of HIV, Illinois Rule 1.6(c)(2) 21 suggests that the attorney
should reveal the client's HIV status and conduct to others in order
to prevent the commission of a crime. Whenever an HIV-infected
person knowingly engages in sexual activity with another without
first disclosing his or her HIV status, he or she violates the Illinois
HIV transmission law22 and poses a risk of serious bodily harm and
death to sexual contacts.
The state supreme court rules seem to direct lawyers to breach
confidentiality in situations where the client expresses a determination to commit an act that would result in the possible transmission
of HIV to a foreseeable and identifiable (or identified) third person.2 Where then is the ethical dilemma? Another law, the AIDS
Confidentiality Act, 24 prohibits disclosure of a person's HIV status.25 Violation of this law is a misdemeanor offense 26 and allows
for both statutory2 7 and civil remedies for trammelling an individual's privacy right.28 This article reviews attorney-client confidentiality and AIDS, the AIDS Confidentiality Act, and the Act's
conflict with the Illinois Supreme Court Rules for attorney conduct. The article then suggests guidelines to solve this particular
quagmire until an authority resolves this issue.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
17. Compare with "intimate contact" definition in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 12-16.2(b) (1991). Sexual conduct is defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
16.

12.12(e) (1991).
18. See supra note 12, for a discussion of the transmission of HIV through
heterosexual activity.

19. See supra note 13.
20. See supra note 13.
21. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, Rule 1.6(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1991).
23. This terminology follows the language used by the California Supreme
Court in a lead case involving a therapist's duty to third parties. Hedlund v.
Superior Ct. of Orange County, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983). See also Mfichael L.
Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, The Duty to Notify Private Third Partiesof the
Risks of HIV Infection, 21 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 295 (1988).
24. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7301 et. seq. (1991).
25.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 7309, 7310 (1991).

26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'/2, para. 7312 (1991).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7313 (1991).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, para. 7314 (1991).
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AIDS

When an individual consults an attorney, the client expects the
attorney will keep all the information that is discussed confidential,
especially personal information. 29 The American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility 3 and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 31 rules of evidence,3 2 and court decisions affirm this generalized expectation.3 3 As recently as 1989, the American Bar Association4 specifically addressed confidentiality in
relation to a client with AIDS35 who engages in risk activities with
others.3 6 After reviewing Disciplinary Rule 4-101, the committee
concluded that a client's AIDS condition should be protected as
privileged information.3 7 Disciplinary Rule 4-101 states:
Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorneyclient privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be
embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not
knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage
of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after
full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or
clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by law or court order.
29. See generally William D. Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59
TEx. L. REV. 755 (1981).
30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6 (1990).
32. 8 JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2292 (1961). See also
FED. R. EviD. 501.
33. See generally EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 87-97
(1984); 8 JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2323 (1961).
34. American Bar Association Policy on AIDS, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 9 (1989).

35. Many early works discussing AIDS misinterpret HIV infection and
AIDS. See Michael L. Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, HIV-AIDS and Governmental Control of Information: International Denial of Human Rights, 4 ST.

THOMAS U. L. REV. 107 (1992). Except where unavoidable, this article will refer
to HIV disease or HIV infection.
36. Risk activities include sexual intercourse and sharing unsterile needles.
INST. OF MEDICINE NAT'L. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: UPDATE
1988, 3 (1988).
37. Report of the AIDS CoordinatingCommittee, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 19, at

39-40 (1989).
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(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the
information necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect
his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates
against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by him from
disclosing or using confidences or secrets of a client, except that a lawyer may reveal
the information allowed by DR 4-101(C) through an
38
employee.
In the discussion of exceptions to the confidentiality privilege,
the committee mentioned disclosure could occur when "the information is necessary to prevent the commission of a crime." 39 At the
time the report was drafted, HIV-specific criminal transmission
statutes were unusual, 4 0 and the transmissibility of HIV was not
41
widely understood.
The hypothetical of an HIV-infected client engaging in sexual
conduct with an uninformed partner arose in a state that follows
the Model Rules. In 1988, when the issue arose before the Delaware Bar Association, the Ethics Committee opined that an attorney could not disclose the client's HIV status to a specifically
identified sexual contact without the client's consent. 42 The committee felt that transmission through sexual conduct was not certain and noted that Delaware did not have a criminal law
specifically prohibiting the conduct in question. 43 Why the committee felt that "certain" transmission through sexual contact was required" in order to permit warning an exposed individual is
unclear.
The Model Rule failed to protect the consort of an HIV-infected client in a state without a criminal transmission law. Arguably, the Model Rule would fail to protect a sexual contact even
where a state has an HIV-specific criminal transmission statute if
the lawyer has no understanding about the transmissibility of HIV.
Model Rule 1.6(a) and 1.6(b)(1) state:
38. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983).

39. Id.
40. Donald H. J. Hermann, CriminalizingConduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.Louis U. PUB.L. REv. 351, 370 (1990).
41. Even today, a fair number of individuals do not understand HIV transmission. See Centers for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Knowledge and Awareness of Testing and Treatment- BehavioralRisk FactorSurveillance System,
1990, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 794, 801 (1992).
42. ABA/BNA LAwYERs' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr, Op. 1988-2
(1990).
43. Anne L. McBride, Deadly Confidentiality:AIDS and Rule 1.6(b), 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 435 (1990).

44. Id. at 436.
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(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (C).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm. 4 s
Thus, Model Rule 1.6 only permissively allows an attorney to
reveal client information to prevent "a criminal act that is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm."'46 The degree
of certainty needed to employ the exception is based on the attorney's subjective perspective 47 that a crime will occur and that the
crime will cause imminent death or imminent bodily harm.4s If the
attorney has no understanding of HIV disease, how could the lawyer form a reasonable belief that disclosure is necessary?
Even if an attorney is well versed in the medical facts about
HIV, Rule 1.6 requires "imminent death or substantial bodily
harm. ' 49 The requirement of imminence works well in situations
such as when a client undergoing a divorce decides to abbreviate the
proceedings by killing the spouse with a firearm, but fails when the
client plans retribution using a slow, progressive, incurable infection. HIV infection progresses from an asymptomatic phase to a
symptomatic phase over a ten year period,5 0 and then progresses to
death in another three to seven years.5 1 For the slower, non-imminent conduct causing another bodily harm and subsequent death,
the attorney must remain a silent bystander under the Model Rule.
Matters relating to disclosure of confidential information concerning a client's conduct 52 are simplified by the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct.0 Illinois Rule 1.6 states:
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6(a), (b)(1) (1990).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1990).
47. The rule states: "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 (1990). Compare

with McBride, supra note 43, at 436 (citing the Delaware Attorney Bar Ethics
Committee requiring certainty).
48. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 cmt. 12 (1990).
49. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1990).

50. Osmond, supra note 13.
51. George F. Lempe et al., Survival Trends for Patients with AIDS, 263
JAMA 402 (1990). In Illinois, of all the AIDS cases diagnosed in 1985, 88% of
those individuals have died from the disease. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, AIDS/HIV SURVEILLANCE REPORT, 5 (1992).
52. Past conduct does not apply, only present and future conduct. See, e.g.,
EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN & MIcHAEL M. MARTIN, THE ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVI-

LEGE, 88-93 (2d ed. 1989).
53. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, art. VIII (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
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(a) Except when required under Rule 1.6(b) or permitted under
Rule 1.6(c), a lawyer shall not, during or after termination of the professional relationship with the client, use or reveal a confidence or secret of the client known to the lawyer unless the client consents after
disclosure.
(b) A lawyer shall reveal information about a client to the extent
it appears necessary to prevent the client from committing an act that
would result in death or serious bodily harm.
(c) A lawyer may use or reveal:
(1) confidences or secrets when permitted under these
Rules or required by law or court order;
(2) the intention of a client to commit a crime in
circum4
stances other than those enumerated in Rule 1.6(b).Illinois Rule 1.6 omits the requirement of a crime and also
drops the requirement of imminence in relation to bodily harm and
death. Moreover, when an attorney knows that certain conduct 55
transmits HIV6 and knows that HIV transmission results in a fatal
disease, 57 he or she must disclose the client's serostatus. 58 In contrast to the permissive language of Model Rule 1.6, Illinois Rule 1.6
requires disclosure.59
If the attorney is unaware of the medical facts concerning HIV
disease, under Illinois Rule 1.6(c)(2), 6 0 the attorney may disclose
the client's serostatus. Sexual conduct by an HIV-infected individual is a felony offense in Illinois,61 and it is reasonable to expect
someone licensed to practice law to be aware of the law. In sum,
the new Illinois Supreme Court Rules either mandate or allow attorney disclosure of a client's confidence. 62 Unfortunately, the
AIDS Confidentiality Act 6 3 complicates the issue.
II.

THE AIDS CONFIDENTIALITY ACT

Prior to the state supreme court's adoption of the Illinois Rules
of Professional Conduct," the state legislature enacted the AIDS
Confidentiality Act.65 The purpose of the Act is to encourage citi54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10A, Rule 1.6(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
55. See supra note 11.
56. See supra note 12.
57. See supra note 13.
58. Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109 (Ill. 1991).
59. Id.
60. ILi. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, Rule 1.6(c)(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
61. ILI. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (1991).
62. The approach should start with persuading the client to disclose. When
that fails, alternatives need to be considered. This article assumes the client
refuses to change conduct and refuses to disclose to others who are identified as
at-risk.
63. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 7301-7316 (1991).
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, art. VIII (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
65. P.A. 85-677 (1985).
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zens to voluntarily test themselves for HIV.r6 To help reach that
goal, the Act adds safeguards to protect confidentiality. 67 Section 9
states: "No person may disclose or be compelled to disclose the identity of any person upon whom a test is performed .... ,"68 In addition, Section 10 states: "No person to whom the results of a test
have been disclosed may disclose the test results to another person
''
except as authorized by Section 9. 69
This presents a problem when a client discloses his or her HIV
status, and discloses an ongoing or future exposure of others to
HIV. 70 While a section of the Act provides for numeroum exceptions, 71 the exceptions expressly apply to health care providers and
to health care facilities. 7 2 Attorneys are neither health care providers7 3 nor health care facilities74 and, because they are not included,
do not appear to fall within this Section's provisions.
When a client discloses his or her HIV status to an attorney,
such disclosure clearly falls within the protection of Sections 9 and
10. Violation of these respective Sections is a misdemeanor offense, 75 leaving the attorney liable for statutory damages, 76 attorney fees, 77 and other actions. 78 Furthermore, the Act does not
preempt tort claims of violation of privacy or professional
79
negligence.
III.

CONCLUSION

Balancing the AIDS Confidentiality Act 8 ° and the Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct s presents a legal dilemma. Balancing disclosure of a client confidence with permitting a client to commit a crime and possibly infect others with a deadly incurable
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1h, para 7302(3) (1991).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 7302(2), 7309, 7310 (1991). Indeed, the
Presidential Commission also noted. "Rigorous maintenance of confidentiality
is considered critical to the success of the public health endeavor to prevent the
transmission and spread of HIV infection." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COM.

MISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, 126 (1988).
68. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7309 (1991).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7310 (1991).
70. See supra note 52.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

ILL. REV.
Id.
ILL. REV.
ILL. REV.
ILL. REV.
ILL. REV.
ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7307 (1991).
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

ch. 111/2, para. 7303(f) (1991).
ch 1111/2, para. 7303(e) (1991).
ch. 1111/2, para. 7312 (1991).
ch. ll'/2, paras. 7313(1), 7313(2) (1991).
ch. 1111/2, para. 7313(3) (1991).

78. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7313(4) (1991).

79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para. 7314 (1991).
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 7301-7316 (1991).
81. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11OA, art. VIII (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992).
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disease presents a poignant moral dilemma.8 2 Fortunately, there
may be a solution.
Rule 1.6(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct requires disclosure, but does not state to whom the attorney must disclose the confidential information. Under Section 15 of the AIDS
Confidentiality Act,8 3 communication to the Illinois Department of
Public Health should be protected from civil liability and criminal
sanction. Section 15 states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impose civil liability or criminal sanction for disclosure of a test result in accordance with any reporting requirement of the Department
8 4 for a diagnosed case of HIV
infection, AIDS or a related condition.
Undoubtedly, this section was designed to safeguard reporting
of HIV infection in accordance with disease reporting require86
ments.8 5 Attorneys, however, are not required to report diseases.
So this legislative exception also seems out of reach. But, since Section 15 uses the words "any reporting requirement,"8 7 a legal argument can be made to protect such disclosure via a regulation
designed for noncompliant HIV carriers.8 8 A complaint from the
attorney to the Department of Health noting the client's noncompliant behavior affords the agency an opportunity to fulfill its responsibility regarding individuals who continue to expose others to
the virus.8 9 Disclosure of the client's HIV status and sexual relationship with an identified individual would satisfy the command of
Illinois Rule 1.6(b) without violating the spirit of the AIDS Confidentiality Act.90
82. In theory, there may also be a common law duty to disclose. The Restatement states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right to protection.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 315 (1965).
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, para 7315 (1991).
84. Id.
85. Interview with Elise Aron, counsel to the Illinois Department of Health
(May 28, 1992).
86. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 693.30(a) (1991).
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111'/2, para. 7315 (1991).
88. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 693.80(b) (1991).
89. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 693.80(a) (1991).
90. To satisfy the common law "duty to warn," mental health professionals
may "warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances." Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d
334, 340 (Cal. 1976). This has been termed the Tarasoff doctrine, which is
largely based upon infectious disease precedent. In an infectious disease context, a better shorthand expression is the Wordin doctrine. See State v. Wordin,
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Until a definitive statement issues from the state court or the
Department of Health, an attorney may wish to document the client's stated intent to continue sexual activities and intent .o withhold his or her serostatus. Any records containing such
information must be carefully safeguarded. The attorney may then
consider consulting the Illinois Department of Public Health. The
department should be able to analyze the gravity of the situation
and assess the need for notification. If notification occurs, an agent
of the public health department can answer any questions the third
party may raise when notified of the exposure and concomitant
risk.
Discussing the situation with anyone else, such as the client's
lover, may invite catastrophe. 9 ' As with other ethical problems, attorneys may consult with other attorneys. However, the attorney
must rigorously safeguard the identity of the client in all discussions with colleagues. 92 In addition to soliciting peer opinions, attorneys may request an opinion from the state and national bar
association ethics committees. However, such opinions are not legally binding and usually take time. 93 Moreover, in the interval between the request and the delivery of the opinion, sexual contacts
may become infected.

14 A. 801 (1887). See Scott H. Isaacman, Significance of Disease Reporting Requirements, 3 INFECTIOUs DISEASE NEws 23 (Oct. 1990).
If there were a common law duty to warn for attorneys in the described
situation, notifying the public health department should satisfy that duty.
From a pragmatic perspective, using public health officials also safeguards the
anonymity of the attorney who ultimately wishes to retain clients and collect

fees for rendered services.
91. The major concern is violence between the individuals and between the
individuals and the attorney.
92. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, paras. 7309, 7310 (1991).

93. Of note, The John Marshall Law School Ethics Committee offers ethical opinions within 48 hours of most requests.

